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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 920484-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM CHRISTENSEN
Priority No. 2
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal concerning the conviction of the Defendant
for violation of the Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505, issuing a bad
check.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah

Code Ann. 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1992) . The Defendant appeals the judgment
of dismissal under Utah Code Ann. 77-18a-l(2)(e)(Supp. 1991)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues on appeal are based upon interpretation of, and
application of the law to the Defendants actions in dealing with
Nephi Lumber Company. The Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505 states:
(1) Any person who issues or passes a
check or draft for the payment of money, for
the purpose of obtaining form any person,
firm, partnership, or corporation, any money

property, or other thing of value or paying
for any services, wages, salary, labor, or
rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee,
is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
The issues presenting on appeal are:
1.

Does a check issued to pay a past due debt upon an open

account over two months after the goods were delivered come within
the proscriptions of the statute.
2.

Does concrete come within the statutory definitions of

services, or is concrete merely a product.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant

text of constitutional, statutory, or rule

provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with Issuing a bad check or draft in a
sum exceeding

$2,000.00,- a second degree

Criminal Code 76-6-505 (3)(d).

felony, under Utah

Defendant was tried by a jury and

was convicted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

Defendant, William

Christensen, who

engaged

in the

construction business, had undertaken a contract to build a cabin
Ln the area of Fairveiw, Utah.

As a part of this project he had
2

contacted three concrete supply companies, Cox Rock Products,
Geneva Slag Co., and Nephi Lumber Company and received quotes for
the delivered price of concrete.

Nephi Lumber gave the low quote

and was willing to deliver to the site for the price quoted.
In June, 1991 the Defendant advised Nephi Lumber, through
their owner-manager, Steve Ludlow, that he wanted to buy concrete
from

them

for his Fairview

credit.(T-10)

job, and wished

He supplied credit references.

to purchase on
Thereafter Steve

Ludlow advised the defendant that they would not extend credit, and
sales would have to be on a C.O.D. basis.

The Defendant promised

payment on delivery, and ordered concrete.(T-ll)
The first loads of concrete were delivered to the cite on July
5, 1991, but the Defendant did not pay for the concrete delivered
at that time. (T-12) However, he did order more loads. Defendant
attempted to cancel this later order, however one truckload was
already on its way and made the delivery.
for.

This load was not paid

At each delivery the Defendant signed a delivery receipt,

which contained provisions consistent with the extension of credit,
i.e. interest to be charged on the open account.(T-13, 18)
The defendant had intended on paying for the concrete from the
proceeds he received form the cabin owner.
failed to pay

However, the owner

the Defendant and consequently he was unable to pay
3

Nephi Lumber Company. (T-40,41)
Nephi Lumber Company made telephone calls to the defendant in
an attempt to collect the debt.

In September the defendant issued

the check in question, payable to Nephi Lumber Company in the sum
in excess of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00).(T-42) The check was
drawn upon an account in the credit Union which was in the name of
the Defendant and his father. (T-52)
Defendant's father testified that the Defendant was living
with him at all times pertinent herein. The Defendant's father also
testified that they discussed Defendants business on frequent
occasions

and

the

Defendant

has

always

been

honest

in his

communications with his father. (T-50) The Defendant had explained
to his father the difficulties he was having on the cabin project,
including the outstanding bill to Nephi Lumber Company. (T-50)
Defendant also discussed with his father his mining business
activities, and advised his father that he had been able to secure
an investor in a certain mining venture. (T-53) That this investor
was going to make a very sizable cash transfer to their Credit
Union Account, which would be used to finance the mining venture,
and which could also be used to pay some of the defendants
outstanding bills, including the bill to Nephi Lumber Company. And
based upon such understanding the defendant prepared and mailed to
4

Nephi

Lumber Company

the check which

is the basis

of this

action.(T-43)
The investor did not make the cash transfer, and the check to
Nephi Lumber Company was dishonored.

The defendant was unable to

recover from his reliance upon the investors promise of financing,
and was then unable to cover checks issued in reliance on the
proposed investment. (T-43) The Defendant explains that he had no
intent to defraud Nephi Lumber Company, and that the check was not
issued as an inducement for Nephi Lumber Company to part with its
goods, but was for payment of a past due credit account.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendant's actions did not fall with in the proscriptions
of the statute under which the Defendant was charged for several
reasons.
First, the Defendant had no intent to defraud Nephi Lumber
Company, and the check was not issued as a inducement for Nephi
Lumber Company to part with its goods but was used for payment of
a past due credit account.
Second, concrete is not a service, but should be found to be
a product under the statute.

Therefore, the check could not be

found to be issued for services, rent, wages, etc as proscribed
under the statute.
5

ARGUMENT
POINT I
CONCRETE CANNOT BE FOUND TO BE A SERVICE UNDER THE STATUTE
In Blacks Law Dictionary Fourth Edition, it states in part
that the term Service "has a variety of meanings depending upon the
context or sense in which used."

Blacks Law Dictionary goes on to

state that service is:
The being employed to serve another; duty or
labor rendered by one person to another, the
former being bound to submit his will to the
direction and control of the latter. The act
of serving; the labor performed or duties
required. Performance of labor for benefit of
another, or at another command; attendance of
an inferior, hired helper, slave, etc.
There has been little attempt to define services under the
court system.

Therefore the words within the code should be given

their accepted meanings.

This point is emphasized

Canadian Pacific Ltd. 754 F.2d 992 (1985).

in In re

"In the absence of

persuasive reasons to the contrary, words in a statute are to be
given their ordinary and common meaning."
In the present case concerning Mr. Christensen the trial court
found that concrete contains services such as delivery and wage^
since workmen have to be employed to make the concrete, and thus
the writing of a check for a past due concrete account would be
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prohibited by Utah Criminal Code 76-6-505. However the Defendant
contends that concrete is not a Service but that concrete is a
product.
Webster's New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, 1988,
defines product:
industry."

The defense states that concrete is a product for

several reasons.
yard.

"something produced by nature or made be human

First, the Defendant bought the concrete by the

For example the concrete was bought like carpet or lumber,

both are considered to be a product and both are bought by a
measured amount. Second, the Defendant was not billed to pay Nephi
Lumber to finish the cement or to set the forms in preparation for
the cement. The Defendant was only billed for the cement. He was
not billed for any type of service, due to the fact that no labor
was preformed, i.e. finishing the cement or preparation for the
cement.

This fact makes it extremely clear that no service was

done for the Defendant.

Due to the definitions and facts stated

above, providing concrete is not providing a service, hence the
statute does not apply to the Defendant's action.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ISSUE THE CHECK WITH THE INTENT TO
DEFRAUD NEPHI LUMBER COMPANY
In the statute it specifically states that the party issuing
7

the check must do so for the purpose of obtaining .... any . . .
property.

And thus to commit the crime the issuing of the check

must be the inducement for the injured party to part with their
goods, or fraudulent intent.
In Colin v. State 168 S.W.2d 500, the court specifically
states that there must be a fraudulent intent.
fraudulent

intent.

If there is no

The Defendant cannot be found guilty of

violating the statute.
The Defendant did not issue the check with the intent to
defraud Nephi Lumber Company. The Defendant had reason to believe
that there would be funds to cover the check written, this belief
constitutes a defense under the courts ruling in a similar case,
People v. Griffith 262 P.2d 355;
In negotiating a check, the maker does not
necessarily represent that he then has in the
bank funds out of which it will be paid; but
he only represents, by the act of passing the
check, that it is a good and valid order for
its amount and that the existing state of
facts is such that in the ordinary course of
business it will be paid on presentation. One
who negotiates a check with knowledge he has
not sufficient funds in the band to meet it,
but who has good reason to believe, and
honestly does believe, that it will be paid,cannot be said to have an intent to defraud
the payee of the check
Reasonable
expectation of payment constitutes a defense
to the charge.
8

There must also be a concurrence in time where there was an
exchange of "something of value" for the bad check.
In a similar case State v. McLean 44 So2d 608, the defendant
was delivered bananas and promised to pay, however when the
defendant in this particular case paid for the bananas, the check
used for payment was not honored.

The court then found;

This language indicates that the crime
denounced is committed only when there is a
concurrence in point of time of an intent to
defraud, the receipt of title and possession
of a thing of value, and the giving of the
worthless check in payment therefore;
If
the check is given subsequent to the receipt
of the thing the required exchange does not
take place, and no intent to defraud attends
the check's issuance. Rather, in such a case,
the check is issued in payment of an
antecedent debt - a debt created by a previous
sale and delivery of the thing on terms of
credit, on a promise to pay , not on the faith
of a check. And on the issuance of the check
the vendor is not by the check defrauded; the
fraud, if any, occurred when credit was
extended.
From this factual situation it is clear that
the worthless check was not given in exchange
for the bananas with the intent to defraud.
The bananas had been entrusted and delivered
to the defendant three days earlier, obviously
on the strength of his promise to pay when all
weights were ascertained.
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POINT III
THE CHECK ISSUED DID NOT FAIL WITHIN THE PROSCRIPTIONS
OF THE STATUTE, BECAUSE IT WAS MADE TO PAY A PREEXISTING DEBT.
It is an uncontested fact that Mr. Christensen gave the check
in question to Nephi Lumber Company to discharge a pre-existing
debt.

In a similar case, Broadus v. State 38 So.2d 692, the

Defendant, Broadus, obtained machinery, and at a later time paid
for the machinery

within that day.

However the payment and the

machinery where not simultaneously exchanged.

The Court in the

Broadus case found that the defendant obtained nothing with the
check.
In the present case the Defendant did not obtain anything for
the check. When Nephi Lumber Company let the cement leave their
possession and control without demanding and receiving the purchase
price, they extended credit for the cement.
Christensen did not receive cement for delivering his check,
for he had already, before that time obtained the cement.
essence he received nothing for his check.

In

The Court in Moore v.

State 38 So.2d 693, (Miss. 1949) restates this

position again.

The delivery of the product (cement) was done before the check was
ever mentioned, therefore the Defendant was simply extended credit
and did not obtain the cement on the basis of a check.
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In State v. Green 972 P.2d 400 (Utah 1983), the defendant,
Green, wrote a check in the amount of $10,000.00 for the purpose of
opening a savings account. The check when presented to the bank it
was drawn on, and was found to be a bad check.
The Court in the Green case found that there was nothing
exchanged for the check and therefore an essential element of the
crime was missing.
This argument can be applied to the present case. The check
was written on a past due debt, so nothing of value was exchanged
on the faith of the check.

The Defendant did not violate the

statute.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse
the trial court's decision concerning the interpretation of the
statute, ruling that concrete is not a service specified, and
further that the bad check was not issued for the purpose of
obtaining the concrete that had been previously delivered, and
consequently the charge against the defendant should be dismissal.
Dated t h i e ^ f ^ day of March, 1993.
MILTON T.'HARMON
Attorney for the Appellant
/
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